US Africa Strategy & the Partnership for Global Infrastructure — PGII, Prosper Africa, and the Lobito Corridor

The Strategic Pivot to Africa

The United States has undergone a fundamental reorientation in its approach to the African continent over the past five years. What was once a policy landscape defined primarily by humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism operations, and trade preference programmes has been reshaped by a single overriding imperative: securing access to the critical minerals that will determine the trajectory of the global energy transition and the balance of great power competition in the twenty-first century. Africa sits at the centre of this reorientation because the continent holds the world's largest reserves of cobalt, substantial deposits of copper, lithium, manganese, graphite, and rare earth elements, and because China has spent two decades building a commanding position over these resources that Washington now urgently seeks to counter.

The scale of the challenge confronting US policymakers is immense. China's mineral acquisitions in Africa began in the early 2000s and accelerated through the Belt and Road Initiative, creating a network of mine ownership, processing dominance, and infrastructure connectivity that gives Beijing effective control over supply chains running from the DRC Copperbelt to Chinese battery factories. The United States, by contrast, entered this competition late. American mining companies had largely withdrawn from Africa during commodity downturns, and US development finance institutions lacked the capital, mandate, and risk appetite to compete with Chinese state banks. The result was a strategic deficit that successive administrations have scrambled to close.

Three interlocking policy frameworks now define the US approach: the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), the Prosper Africa initiative, and the expanded mandate of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Together, these instruments represent the most significant US commitment to African economic engagement in decades. The Lobito Corridor has become the centrepiece of this strategy, a tangible demonstration project intended to prove that the United States can offer African nations a viable alternative to Chinese infrastructure and mineral investment.

PGII: The Infrastructure Counter-Offer

The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, launched by President Biden at the 2022 G7 summit in Germany, represents the most ambitious US infrastructure initiative directed at the developing world since the Cold War. PGII committed the G7 nations to mobilise $600 billion in infrastructure investment by 2027, with the explicit purpose of providing a transparent, high-standard alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. The United States pledged to mobilise $200 billion of that total, channelled through a combination of government financing, development finance, and private sector investment.

PGII was not conceived in a vacuum. It emerged from a recognition that the United States and its allies had spent years criticising the Belt and Road Initiative without offering a credible alternative. African leaders had made clear, publicly and privately, that lectures about Chinese debt traps and governance concerns were meaningless without concrete investment proposals. The infrastructure deficit across Africa, estimated at $100 billion annually by the African Development Bank, could not be addressed through criticism of Chinese construction practices. It required capital, and PGII was designed to provide it.

The initiative is structured around four priority pillars: climate and energy security, digital connectivity, health systems, and gender equity and equality. But in practice, the mineral security dimension has dominated PGII's Africa portfolio. The flagship PGII investments on the continent are concentrated in the mining and transport infrastructure sectors, reflecting the reality that critical mineral supply chains are where US strategic interests and African development needs most clearly align.

The Lobito Corridor was announced as the signature PGII project in Africa at the September 2023 G20 summit, with President Biden, alongside the leaders of Angola, the DRC, and Zambia, presenting the corridor as proof of concept for the entire PGII framework. The announcement committed initial US financing exceeding $250 million for the rehabilitation of the Lobito Atlantic Railway and associated infrastructure, with a broader investment pipeline valued at several billion dollars encompassing rail, road, digital, agricultural, and clean energy projects along the corridor route.

PGII's effectiveness as a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative remains contested. Critics note that the $600 billion G7 commitment is a mobilisation target that aggregates existing programmes, new government spending, and anticipated private investment, making direct comparison with BRI expenditure misleading. The pace of PGII disbursement has been slower than Chinese infrastructure delivery, which benefits from the speed of state-directed construction companies operating without the environmental and social safeguards that Western-financed projects require. Supporters counter that PGII's emphasis on transparency, labour standards, environmental protection, and debt sustainability produces better long-term outcomes for host countries, even if project timelines are longer.

Prosper Africa & Trade Architecture

Prosper Africa, launched in 2019 under the Trump administration and expanded under Biden, represents the trade and commercial dimension of US Africa engagement. The initiative consolidates the resources of seventeen US government agencies to facilitate two-way trade and investment between the United States and African nations. Prosper Africa's mandate encompasses deal facilitation, market intelligence, regulatory assistance, and coordination of US government tools including the Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development Agency, and the DFC.

In the context of critical mineral strategy, Prosper Africa serves as the commercial intelligence arm that identifies investment opportunities, connects US companies with African partners, and navigates the regulatory environments of host countries. The initiative has facilitated deals in the mining, energy, and infrastructure sectors that align with broader US strategic objectives, including mineral offtake agreements, processing facility investments, and transport infrastructure projects along the Lobito Corridor and other priority routes.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the preferential trade programme that grants duty-free access to the US market for eligible African countries, provides additional leverage. AGOA's periodic reauthorisation process creates diplomatic opportunities to align trade preferences with mineral security objectives, encouraging African governments to strengthen governance frameworks, improve investment climates, and adopt regulatory standards that facilitate Western mining investment. The strategic use of trade preferences to incentivise mineral supply chain alignment is an increasingly important dimension of US Africa policy.

Prosper Africa has also supported the development of mineral traceability and responsible sourcing frameworks, responding to growing requirements from US and European manufacturers for transparent, ethically sourced mineral inputs. The initiative's work on supply chain transparency serves a dual purpose: it addresses legitimate concerns about labour conditions and environmental standards in African mining, and it creates regulatory and market conditions that favour Western-aligned supply chains over opaque Chinese-controlled ones.

DFC: Development Finance as Strategy

The US International Development Finance Corporation, established in 2019 through the BUILD Act, has emerged as the most important single instrument in the US critical mineral strategy for Africa. The DFC was created by consolidating the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and elements of USAID into a single institution with an expanded investment cap of $60 billion, equity investment authority, and a mandate to support private sector development in lower- and middle-income countries. Under former CEO Scott Nathan, the DFC moved aggressively to position itself as a strategic investor in African mineral supply chains.

The DFC's Lobito Corridor investments represent the institution's largest single commitment in Africa and one of its most strategically significant globally. The DFC provided a $553 million loan facility to the Lobito Atlantic Railway consortium, led by Trafigura's Mota-Engil joint venture, to finance the rehabilitation and operation of the Benguela Railway from the port of Lobito to the DRC border. Additional DFC commitments along the corridor include investments in greenfield rail extensions, agricultural value chains, digital infrastructure, and clean energy projects.

The DFC's investment approach in Africa has several distinguishing characteristics. First, it operates as a catalytic investor, providing concessional or blended finance designed to de-risk projects sufficiently to attract private capital. The DFC loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway, for instance, was structured to reduce the risk profile of the overall project to a level that enabled additional financing from commercial banks and European development finance institutions. Second, the DFC brings a mandate for development impact alongside strategic objectives, requiring investments to demonstrate job creation, environmental stewardship, and local economic benefits that Chinese state-backed projects do not consistently deliver. Third, the DFC's equity authority allows it to take ownership stakes in mining and processing ventures, a tool previously unavailable to US development finance and one that is increasingly important as competition for African mineral assets intensifies.

The DFC has also invested in mineral processing initiatives designed to break China's near-monopoly on critical mineral refining. Investments in processing facilities in Africa and allied nations aim to create alternative refining capacity for cobalt, lithium, and rare earths, reducing the dependence on Chinese refineries that currently process the vast majority of these minerals regardless of where they are mined.

The Lobito Corridor as Flagship

The Lobito Corridor occupies a unique position in US Africa strategy. It is simultaneously an infrastructure project, a mineral supply chain initiative, a development programme, and a geopolitical statement. President Biden's December 2024 visit to Angola, the first by a sitting US president, was structured entirely around the corridor, underscoring its centrality to the administration's Africa legacy.

The strategic logic of the Lobito Corridor from a US perspective rests on several interlocking propositions. The corridor provides a westward export route for minerals from the DRC and Zambian Copperbelts, offering an alternative to the eastern routes through Dar es Salaam and Durban that currently handle the majority of the region's mineral exports. By creating a shorter, faster route to Atlantic shipping lanes, the corridor reduces transport costs and transit times for mineral cargoes destined for European and North American markets. Critically, it provides a logistical pathway that does not pass through Chinese-controlled port infrastructure or depend on Chinese-financed transport networks.

The corridor also serves as a platform for broader economic development along its route. The US vision extends beyond mineral transport to encompass agricultural value chains, digital connectivity, renewable energy, and economic zone development in the communities through which the railway passes. This comprehensive approach is designed to differentiate the Lobito Corridor from Chinese infrastructure projects, which critics argue serve primarily to extract resources rather than to develop local economies.

The involvement of multiple US agencies in the corridor demonstrates the whole-of-government approach that characterises the current strategy. The DFC provides project finance. The State Department manages diplomatic relationships with host governments. USAID supports community development and environmental programmes along the corridor route. The Commerce Department facilitates US private sector participation. The Pentagon's Africa Command (AFRICOM) provides security assessment. The Export-Import Bank offers financing for US equipment and technology. This multi-agency coordination, while bureaucratically complex, is intended to match the comprehensive engagement model that Chinese state entities deliver through unified command structures.

Bipartisan Convergence on Minerals

One of the most significant developments in US Africa policy is the emergence of bipartisan consensus on the strategic importance of African critical minerals. Unlike many areas of foreign policy where partisan divisions have paralysed action, mineral security has attracted support from both parties, driven by the shared recognition that Chinese dominance over critical mineral supply chains threatens US economic competitiveness and national security.

The bipartisan foundation was laid by several legislative initiatives. The Energy Act of 2020, passed with broad bipartisan support, established a federal strategy for critical mineral supply chains. The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, despite being passed on a party-line vote, included provisions on critical mineral sourcing that reflected bipartisan security concerns. The CHIPS and Science Act, also passed in 2022, included provisions supporting critical mineral research and development. The Mineral Security Partnerships (MSP), launched in 2022, brought together allies including Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom to coordinate critical mineral supply chain development.

Congressional interest in African minerals has intensified across both chambers and both parties. Republican members have emphasised the national security dimensions, framing mineral dependency on China as a strategic vulnerability comparable to energy dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Democratic members have emphasised the economic opportunity and climate dimensions, arguing that securing mineral supply chains is essential to the clean energy transition. Both parties have supported expanded DFC authority and financing for African mineral projects. The House and Senate Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees have held multiple hearings on critical mineral supply chains, with witnesses from both administrations, industry, and think tanks advocating for enhanced US engagement in African mining.

This bipartisan foundation has practical implications. It means that US mineral security commitments in Africa are more likely to survive changes of administration than purely executive actions typically do. It provides political cover for investments that carry financial risk. And it creates a competitive dynamic where both parties seek to demonstrate their commitment to countering Chinese mineral dominance, generating sustained political momentum behind African engagement.

Trump Administration Continuity

The transition from the Biden to the Trump administration in January 2025 raised immediate questions about the continuity of US Africa strategy, particularly the PGII framework and the Lobito Corridor commitments. The Trump administration's broader foreign policy orientation, emphasising bilateral deal-making over multilateral frameworks, reducing development assistance, and prioritising domestic energy production over international climate commitments, seemed potentially at odds with the infrastructure-and-minerals approach developed under Biden.

In practice, the Trump administration has maintained and in some respects accelerated the mineral security dimensions of Africa policy while rebranding and reorienting the broader framework. The administration's approach reflects the recognition that critical mineral security transcends partisan politics. The same supply chain vulnerabilities that concerned Biden officials concern Trump officials, and the same Chinese dominance that motivated PGII motivates the current administration's resource strategy.

The Lobito Corridor has continued to advance under the new administration, though with shifts in emphasis and framing. The DFC's committed investments have been maintained, and the railway rehabilitation has progressed. The administration has framed the corridor more explicitly as a resource access initiative and less as a development programme, aligning it with a broader minerals-first foreign policy that prioritises securing supply agreements and offtake commitments for US manufacturers.

The Trump administration has also pursued bilateral mineral agreements more aggressively, negotiating directly with African governments for preferential access to critical mineral deposits. This approach de-emphasises the multilateral coordination mechanisms favoured under Biden, such as the Mineral Security Partnership, in favour of direct government-to-government deals that resemble in style, if not in structure, the bilateral arrangements that characterise Chinese mineral diplomacy. The administration has signalled willingness to use trade policy tools, including tariff adjustments and AGOA eligibility, as leverage in mineral access negotiations.

One area where continuity has been particularly notable is in DFC operations. Despite broader cuts to development assistance and foreign aid budgets, the DFC's mineral-related investments have been largely preserved, reflecting bipartisan congressional support and the recognition that development finance is a critical tool in the competition with Chinese state capital. The DFC's Africa portfolio has continued to expand, with new investments in mineral exploration, processing, and transport infrastructure advancing through the pipeline.

Strategic Outlook

The US Africa strategy is entering a critical phase. The infrastructure commitments made under PGII and the DFC are moving from announcement to implementation, a transition that will test whether the United States can deliver on its promises at a pace and scale sufficient to alter the competitive landscape. Several factors will determine the strategy's success.

First, delivery speed is paramount. African governments evaluate partners primarily on their ability to deliver tangible results. China's advantage has always been speed of execution, and Western promises that take years to materialise lose credibility with each delay. The Lobito Corridor's progress through construction and early operations will be the primary benchmark against which African leaders assess US reliability.

Second, private sector mobilisation must succeed. Unlike China, where state-owned enterprises execute government strategy with state capital, the US approach depends on attracting private investment. The DFC's catalytic role is designed to de-risk projects to the point where commercial capital follows, but this model requires investment returns that justify private sector participation. If the Lobito Corridor and associated mineral investments demonstrate commercial viability, they will attract a self-sustaining flow of private capital. If they do not, the strategy will depend indefinitely on government subsidy.

Third, diplomatic consistency must be maintained across administrations. African leaders have long expressed frustration with US policy volatility, observing that American priorities shift with each election while Chinese engagement remains consistent over decades. The bipartisan consensus on mineral security provides a foundation for continuity, but the specific instruments, institutions, and relationships that implement the strategy must survive political transitions to build the long-term trust that African partners require.

Fourth, the United States must navigate the tension between strategic interests and development impact. If the US approach is perceived by African populations and governments as merely a new form of resource extraction dressed in development language, it will lose legitimacy and political support in host countries. Genuine investment in local value addition, employment, skills transfer, and community development along the corridor and at mine sites is essential to maintaining the social licence that distinguishes the Western model from its competitors.

The US Africa strategy is no longer a question of whether to engage, but how effectively. The investments are committed, the institutions are mobilised, and the strategic rationale is clear. What remains to be determined is whether the implementation can match the ambition, and whether the United States can sustain the political will, financial commitment, and diplomatic consistency required to compete effectively in a continent where China has a twenty-year head start.