EGC — Entreprise Generale du Cobalt

Organisation Overview

The Entreprise Generale du Cobalt (EGC) is a subsidiary of Gecamines, the DRC's state mining company, established by government decree in 2019 to serve as the exclusive state buyer and marketer of artisanally mined strategic minerals. The EGC represents the DRC government's most ambitious attempt to assert control over the artisanal mineral supply chain — a sector that produces a significant share of the world's cobalt and involves the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of miners in the Copperbelt provinces.

The EGC's creation was driven by multiple policy objectives: capturing greater value from artisanal mineral production for the Congolese state; creating a formalised, traceable supply chain that meets the responsible sourcing requirements of international buyers; establishing a mechanism to regulate prices and production volumes in the artisanal sector; and concentrating commercial power in a state entity that could negotiate with global commodity markets from a position of strength.

Mandate & Legal Basis

The EGC's mandate derives from a 2019 government decree that designated it as the sole authorised purchaser, processor, and marketer of artisanally mined cobalt, coltan, and germanium in the DRC. This decree was issued under the authority of the 2018 Mining Code, which established the framework for strategic mineral management and empowered the government to create state-controlled entities for the commercialisation of designated strategic substances.

Under its mandate, the EGC has the exclusive right to purchase strategic minerals from artisanal miners and their cooperatives. No other entity — private trader, mining company, or intermediary — is legally permitted to buy artisanal cobalt, coltan, or germanium for export. The EGC is responsible for grading, processing, and packaging the minerals it purchases, and for marketing them to international buyers through its commercial partnerships.

The legal basis of the EGC's monopoly has been challenged on several grounds. Some have argued that the monopoly violates constitutional protections of economic freedom and competition. Others have contended that the decree creating the EGC exceeded the government's authority under the Mining Code. Mining companies have raised concerns that the EGC's monopoly disrupts their own artisanal sourcing arrangements and supply chain partnerships. As of 2025, the EGC's mandate remains in force, supported by subsequent ministerial orders and presidential statements affirming the government's commitment to the organisation.

Trafigura Partnership

The EGC's most significant commercial relationship is its partnership with Trafigura, one of the world's largest commodity trading houses. Under an agreement signed shortly after the EGC's establishment, Trafigura serves as the primary off-taker and marketer of artisanal cobalt purchased by the EGC. Trafigura provides financing for the EGC's purchasing operations, logistics support for mineral transport and export, and market access to downstream processors and end-users globally.

The Trafigura partnership was designed to solve a practical problem: the EGC, as a newly created entity with limited commercial experience and no established relationships with international cobalt buyers, needed a partner with the trading infrastructure, financing capacity, and market knowledge to commercialise artisanal cobalt at competitive prices. Trafigura, which had existing cobalt trading operations and a stated commitment to responsible sourcing, was selected through a process that was not fully transparent but had government endorsement.

The terms of the Trafigura agreement have not been fully disclosed to the public, and questions about the distribution of commercial benefits between the EGC, Trafigura, Gecamines, and artisanal miners remain a subject of civil society scrutiny. Organisations including Global Witness and the Carter Center have called for greater transparency in the EGC's commercial arrangements, arguing that the opacity of the Trafigura deal makes it difficult to assess whether artisanal miners are receiving a fair share of the final sale value of their production.

Trafigura's involvement also raises questions about responsible sourcing. As the marketer of artisanal cobalt, Trafigura assumes supply chain responsibility under emerging regulations including the EU Battery Regulation and the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). The company has stated that it applies due diligence processes to EGC-sourced material, but the challenges of ensuring full traceability in the DRC's artisanal sector are well documented.

Purchasing Operations

The EGC's purchasing operations are centred in and around Kolwezi, the hub of artisanal copper-cobalt mining in Lualaba Province. The EGC operates purchasing stations (depots d'achat) where registered cooperatives and individual miners can sell their production. At these stations, EGC staff weigh, grade, and price the mineral ore, and issue payment to sellers.

The purchasing process is intended to be standardised: miners bring ore to the station, where it is analysed for cobalt or copper content, weighed, and priced according to the EGC's published pricing schedule. Payment is made either in cash or through mobile money platforms. The EGC issues documentation for each transaction, creating a paper trail that supports traceability from the purchasing point to the export market.

In practice, the purchasing operations face significant logistical challenges. The number of artisanal miners and mining sites in the Kolwezi area vastly exceeds the EGC's purchasing capacity. Queues at purchasing stations can stretch for days, particularly during periods of high production. Cash flow constraints have periodically prevented the EGC from purchasing all available material, forcing miners to stockpile or to sell through informal channels that bypass the monopoly. The EGC's grading and pricing processes have been criticised by miners who believe their ore is systematically undervalued.

Pricing Mechanism

The EGC's pricing mechanism is one of the most contentious aspects of its operations. The organisation sets purchasing prices for artisanal cobalt and other strategic minerals based on a formula that references international market prices, adjusted for processing costs, transport, and the EGC's margin. These prices are published periodically and applied at all purchasing stations.

Artisanal miners and their advocates have consistently argued that EGC purchasing prices are too low — significantly below what miners could obtain on the informal market before the EGC's monopoly was established. The price differential between EGC purchasing prices and international cobalt prices is substantial, reflecting the multiple intermediaries and costs between the mine site and the global market. However, critics argue that the EGC captures a disproportionate share of this margin at the expense of miners who have no alternative buyer.

The pricing tension was exacerbated during the cobalt price collapse of 2023-2024, when the EGC was forced to reduce purchasing prices to levels that left miners earning below subsistence wages. The subsequent export intervention in February 2025, which drove international cobalt prices up fourfold, improved the EGC's economics significantly — but the extent to which higher international prices translated into higher purchasing prices for artisanal miners was uneven and delayed.

Implementation Challenges

The EGC's implementation has been uneven since its establishment, facing challenges that are both operational and structural.

The most fundamental challenge is the gap between the EGC's monopoly mandate and its operational capacity. The organisation was created to control a supply chain involving hundreds of thousands of miners operating across thousands of sites in a region with limited institutional infrastructure. Building purchasing operations, quality control systems, logistics networks, and financial management capacity sufficient to handle this scale has taken years and is still incomplete.

The persistence of informal trading networks is a direct consequence of this capacity gap. When the EGC cannot purchase all available artisanal production — whether due to cash flow constraints, logistical limitations, or pricing disagreements — miners sell through informal channels. These parallel markets undermine the EGC's monopoly, reduce the effectiveness of traceability systems, and deprive the state of revenue. Estimates of the share of artisanal cobalt that bypasses the EGC vary widely, from 20 to 50 percent or more.

Governance concerns also affect the EGC's credibility. As a subsidiary of Gecamines, the EGC inherits some of the parent company's governance challenges, including limited financial transparency, political influence over commercial decisions, and questions about the allocation of revenues between the organisation, its parent, and the state treasury. These concerns are amplified by the EGC's monopoly position, which eliminates the market competition that might otherwise impose discipline on pricing and efficiency.

Corridor Milestone — February 2026

In February 2026, the EGC shipped its first consignment of artisanally sourced copper and cobalt via the Lobito Corridor, using the Lobito Atlantic Railway to transport the minerals from the DRC to the Port of Lobito in Angola. This shipment represented a milestone on multiple levels.

For the EGC, the corridor shipment demonstrated that its supply chain — from artisanal mine site to cooperative to EGC purchasing station to rail transport to international port — can function as an integrated system. For the Lobito Corridor, it established a precedent that artisanally sourced minerals, not just industrial production, can be routed through the corridor infrastructure. For the international responsible cobalt supply chain, it provided evidence that artisanal cobalt can be transported through a formal, documented logistics system that supports traceability from source to market.

The significance of this milestone should not be overstated — the volumes involved were modest relative to total artisanal production, and the challenges described above remain unresolved. But the February 2026 shipment established a practical pathway that, if scaled, could integrate the DRC's artisanal mining sector into the corridor's commercial framework. Whether this pathway develops into a significant trade flow will depend on the EGC's operational capacity, the corridor's infrastructure rehabilitation progress, and the commercial terms that determine whether routing minerals through the corridor is economically attractive for both the EGC and the miners who supply it.