DRC Cobalt Export Policy

Policy Overview

The DRC's cobalt export policy has undergone a dramatic transformation from the laissez-faire approach of the early 2000s to the interventionist posture that characterises the current government's management of the mineral. The DRC's dominant position in global cobalt production — supplying between 72 and 78 percent of world output — gives it market influence comparable to OPEC's role in oil markets. Under President Felix Tshisekedi, the government has demonstrated a willingness to exercise this influence, deploying export restrictions, quota systems, and monopoly purchasing arrangements to shape cobalt markets and capture greater value from the country's mineral endowment.

The policy framework rests on several pillars: the 2018 Mining Code's strategic mineral provisions, which give the government enhanced regulatory authority over designated substances; the Entreprise Generale du Cobalt (EGC), which holds a monopoly over artisanal cobalt purchasing; and the government's willingness to use executive authority — including presidential decrees and ministerial orders — to intervene directly in export flows when market conditions warrant.

2025 Export Ban & Quota System

In February 2025, the DRC government imposed temporary restrictions on cobalt exports in response to a severe price collapse that had driven cobalt hydroxide prices to approximately $21,500 per tonne — a level that rendered many DRC operations unprofitable and devastated the artisanal mining sector. The intervention took the form of a temporary ban on new export permits, followed by the introduction of a quota system that limited the volume of cobalt that could be exported during specified periods.

The immediate market impact was dramatic. Cobalt hydroxide prices surged more than fourfold in the months following the intervention, rising above $48,500 per tonne by October 2025. The price recovery restored profitability to DRC cobalt operations and provided relief to artisanal miners whose incomes had been devastated by the downturn.

The mechanics of the intervention involved several coordinated actions. The Ministry of Mines issued an order suspending the issuance of new export authorisations for cobalt products. Existing export permits were not cancelled but were not renewed upon expiry. A quota committee was established to allocate permitted export volumes among producers based on their production capacity and compliance history. Industrial producers were allocated quotas proportional to their installed capacity, while the EGC received a separate allocation for artisanally sourced material.

Strategic Mineral Designation

The legal basis for the DRC's cobalt export intervention lies in the 2018 Mining Code's strategic mineral provisions. Cobalt was designated as a "substance strategique" (strategic substance) under the 2018 Code, along with coltan, germanium, and subsequently lithium. The strategic designation empowers the government to impose enhanced regulatory requirements on the production, processing, transport, and export of designated minerals, including the authority to set production quotas, restrict exports, and establish state purchasing monopolies.

The strategic mineral framework represents a significant assertion of resource sovereignty by the DRC government. By designating minerals that are essential to global technology and energy supply chains as strategic substances, the government has created a legal mechanism to intervene in markets where the DRC holds dominant supply positions. The framework is explicitly modelled on resource management regimes in other commodity-producing countries, particularly OPEC's management of oil production quotas.

Mining companies have challenged the strategic mineral designation on several grounds. Some have argued that the designation violates the stability clauses of their mining permits. Others have contended that the export restrictions constitute a de facto expropriation of production value. These challenges have been pursued through administrative appeals, diplomatic representations, and in some cases international arbitration proceedings. As of 2025, no challenge has succeeded in overturning the strategic mineral framework.

EGC Monopoly & Market Control

The Entreprise Generale du Cobalt (EGC) is a central instrument of the DRC's cobalt export policy. Established in 2019 as a subsidiary of Gecamines, the EGC holds the exclusive mandate to purchase all artisanally mined cobalt in the DRC. This monopoly gives the government direct control over the commercialisation of artisanal cobalt, which represents an estimated 15 to 30 percent of total DRC cobalt output.

The EGC's monopoly serves multiple policy objectives: it provides a mechanism for traceability and quality control in the artisanal supply chain; it enables the government to set purchasing prices for artisanal cobalt, theoretically protecting miners from exploitation by informal traders; it creates a single point of export for artisanal material, facilitating the application of export quotas; and it generates commercial revenues for Gecamines and the state through the margin between purchasing prices and export sale prices.

The EGC's commercial partnership with Trafigura, the Swiss commodity trading house, provides the marketing and logistics expertise necessary to sell artisanal cobalt on international markets. Under this arrangement, Trafigura purchases cobalt from the EGC at negotiated prices and sells it to downstream processors, primarily in China and increasingly in other markets. The terms of the Trafigura deal have not been fully disclosed, and questions about the distribution of commercial benefits between the EGC, Trafigura, and artisanal miners remain a subject of civil society scrutiny.

Artisanal Sector Regulation

The cobalt export policy intersects directly with the DRC's broader effort to regulate the artisanal mining sector. In December 2025, the Minister of Mines signed a decree regulating artisanal mining in Kolwezi, following a temporary ban and audit of artisanal activities that had triggered civil unrest. The decree formalised operating requirements for artisanal cooperatives, established safety standards, and reinforced the EGC's monopoly purchasing mandate.

The regulation of artisanal cobalt mining is politically sensitive because it directly affects the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people. Restrictions on artisanal activity — whether through export bans that reduce demand for artisanal material, safety shutdowns that close mining sites, or EGC purchasing policies that offer prices miners consider inadequate — can trigger rapid social and political responses. The December 2025 Kolwezi decree illustrates the government's attempt to balance formalisation objectives (traceability, safety, revenue capture) against livelihood concerns (employment, income, community stability).

The cobalt export policy also has implications for responsible sourcing initiatives. International buyers increasingly require traceability from mine site to end product, driven by regulations such as the EU Battery Regulation and corporate sustainability commitments. The EGC's monopoly, by creating a single documented purchasing channel for artisanal cobalt, facilitates traceability in principle. In practice, the implementation challenges — including the continued existence of informal trading networks that bypass the EGC — limit the assurance that traceability systems can provide.

Market Impact

The DRC's cobalt export intervention has had profound effects on global cobalt markets. The fourfold price increase following the February 2025 ban demonstrated the DRC's ability to move global commodity prices through supply-side intervention. This market power derives from a simple fact: there is no near-term substitute for DRC cobalt supply on the scale required by the global battery industry.

However, the intervention has also accelerated efforts by consuming nations and companies to reduce their dependence on DRC cobalt. Battery chemistries with lower cobalt content (particularly lithium iron phosphate, or LFP, which uses no cobalt) have gained market share. Cobalt recycling programmes have received increased investment. And exploration for cobalt deposits outside the DRC — in Australia, Canada, Philippines, and elsewhere — has intensified, though no alternative source can match the DRC's scale within the next decade.

The price recovery also revealed the limits of market intervention. As prices rose, some DRC producers found ways to export stockpiled material through neighbouring countries, undermining the effectiveness of the quota system. Cross-border smuggling of cobalt through Zambia — a longstanding issue — increased as the price differential between DRC domestic and international market prices widened. These leakages highlight the difficulty of enforcing export controls in a region with porous borders and limited customs capacity.

Geopolitical Dimensions

The DRC's cobalt export policy has significant geopolitical dimensions. China, which processes over 70 percent of the world's cobalt and is the largest buyer of DRC cobalt, viewed the export restrictions with concern. Chinese-owned mining operations in the DRC, including CMOC's Tenke Fungurume and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt's operations, were directly affected by the quota system. Chinese diplomatic representations pressed for the quota system to be relaxed, and Chinese companies explored alternative supply sources and processing routes to reduce their vulnerability to DRC policy actions.

Western governments, particularly the United States, viewed the DRC's assertion of market power with a mix of concern and strategic opportunity. The US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in December 2025, addressed cobalt supply chain security by committing the DRC to channel specified percentages of state-controlled mineral exports through the Lobito Corridor. This arrangement effectively aligns the DRC's cobalt export policy with US supply chain diversification objectives, directing cobalt flows westward through the corridor rather than eastward through Chinese-controlled networks.

The cobalt export policy also intersects with the DRC's relationships with multilateral institutions. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which have programmes in the DRC, have cautioned against export restrictions that could deter investment and reduce long-term mineral revenue. The government's response has been that the DRC has the sovereign right to manage its strategic mineral resources, a position with broad domestic political support.

Corridor Implications

The DRC's cobalt export policy is directly relevant to the Lobito Corridor in several ways. First, the policy demonstrates the government's willingness and ability to direct mineral trade flows — a capacity that could be used to mandate corridor usage for cobalt exports. Second, the EGC's February 2026 corridor shipment established a practical precedent for routing artisanal cobalt through the corridor. Third, the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement's mineral routing commitments create a policy framework that ties cobalt export policy to corridor utilisation.

For the corridor's commercial model, the cobalt export policy creates both opportunity and risk. The opportunity lies in the potential for government policy to direct cobalt exports through the corridor, providing a guaranteed freight base. The risk lies in the policy's inherent unpredictability — the same government authority that directs minerals toward the corridor could, under different circumstances, redirect them elsewhere. The cobalt export policy is a powerful reminder that the Lobito Corridor's commercial viability depends not only on infrastructure quality and logistics efficiency but also on the regulatory and political environment in the DRC.